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I. PROLOGUE: A PAGE OF AMERICAN HISTORY
A. Beating Back the Evil of the World
Nearly a century ago, in a 1906 address to honor John Brown, W.E.B.
DuBois reminded his listeners that we must "sacrifice our work, our money,
and our positions in order to beat back the evil of the world."' DuBois, a
slavery scholar, understood that peculiar institution's evil and he anticipated
its potential legacy throughout the twentieth century.2 He and other guests
praised Brown's efforts to halt slavery, noting the noble sacrifice Brown
and the twenty-one other men made to liberate slaves.3 Reverdy C. Ransom
explained how Brown had made the supreme sacrifice and how his soul
went marching on in those who continued the fight for equality despite stri-
dent opposition.4 Modem champions of equality are heirs to John Brown's
spirit and it falls to each of us to beat back inequality, racial hegemony, and
other modem forms of American caste. By caste, we mean the systemic
status inequality in the United States, resulting from longstanding discrimi-
natory practices endorsed by federal, state, and local government.
Thus, it is fitting and timely that lawyers and scholars remember John
Brown's legacy and those who have sought substantive reforms for certain
Americans treated as outcasts. Although many men and women have given
their lives in this worthy cause, we have chosen former Supreme Court As-
sociate Justice Thurgood Marshall as our subject because, like John Brown,
Marshall is also an American hero who sacrificed his life to liberate all
Americans from the stains of state-sponsored discrimination.
Old Captain John Brown was an American who loved his family and his
country, but he despised human bondage.5 A deeply religious man, Brown
found in the Bible an unequivocal, uncompromising opposition to slavery.
6
Human inequality, especially slavery, was an abomination to God.7 Brown
believed it was the duty of every Christian to oppose slavery at all costs.
8
This calling would take Brown on a journey away from his family in Con-
necticut to Massachusetts, New York, Kansas, Canada, Maryland, and fi-
nally to Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859. 9
1. BENJAMIN QUARLES, ALLIES FOR FREEDOM 7 (1974); see also ELIJAH AVEY, THE CAPTURE
AND EXECUTION OF JOHN BROWN (1971); BLACKS ON JOHN BROWN (Benjamin Quarles ed., 1972);
W.E.B. DUBOiS, JOHN BROWN: A BIOGRAPHY (John David Smith ed., 1997); TRUMAN NELSON, THE
OLD MAN: JOHN BROWN AT HARPER'S FERRY (1973).
2. See QUARLES, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 7-9.
5. Id. at 11-12.
6. Id. at 11-13.
7. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 11-13.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1-92. We have followed Quarles in omitting the possessive form of "Harpers Ferry"
throughout this Article.
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John Brown was a visionary leader who had the temerity to challenge
slave power in the United States. "To [Brown,] the color of a man's skin
was no measure of his worth."1° Brown acted toward African-Americans as
social equals; he appeared completely void of color prejudice." Rather than
accept a service denied African-Americans, Brown's egalitarianism caused
him to eschew white privilege.12 Instead, he would help organize the League
of Gileadites to rescue and protect runaway slaves from their pursuers.'
3
Born in 1800, Brown came of age during the infancy of the new nation
when slave interests sought to expand west as the nation's size doubled
through the Louisiana Purchase and American aggression in Texas and
Mexico.' 4 Abolitionist societies opposed any additional slavery compro-
mises and campaigned against slavery throughout the United States, the
British Isles, and the West Indies.' 5 Brown was persuaded that slavery
lacked any legitimacy and could be opposed by any means necessary. 6 He
and his family committed themselves to help in the sectional fight that had
swept the nation. 17 Brown employed the same revolutionary zeal that was
used to liberate white men from England, to demand the liberation of Afri-
can-Americans. Brown put, "humanity above race, right above law, and
freedom above everything."'
' 8
Brown studied the lives of Toussaint L'Ouverture, Denmark Vesey, and
Nat Turner.' 9 He met with Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, and others
to discuss their rescue work as conductors on the Underground Railroad.20
Brown himself made one incursion into Missouri to liberate a dozen slaves
and escort them to freedom in Canada.2'
Unlike many abolitionists, Brown had most of his primary relationships
with African-Americans.22 He was a guest in their homes; he ate at the same
table as they did. He often directed that his correspondence be delivered to
the home of an African-American friend.24 John and Mary Brown did not
conduct themselves as superior to the poorest African-Americans and they
raised their children the same way. The Browns did not embrace white
privilege. They were ardent champions of freedom for all humans.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 13.
12. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 13-14.
13. Id. at 25-27, 81-82.
14. Id. at 14-15.
15. Id. at 17-22.
16. Id. at 11-14.
17. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 17-18.
18. J. Max Barber, John Brown in Bronze, 1800-1859, Containing Program and Addresses of the
Dedicatory Ceremony and Unveiling of the Monument of John Brown, May 9, 1935 (1935), reprinted in
BLACKS ON JOHN BROWN, supra note 1, at 115.
19. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 64-65.
20. Id. at 19-22, 41-42.
21. Id. at 54-60.
22. Id. at 65.
23. Id. at 38-39.
24. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 39.
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As the sectional divide over slavery expanded with the enactment of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,25 the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854,26 and the
Dred Scott2 7 decision in 1857, Brown became convinced that slave libera-
tion would not occur without force and a little bloodshed. 28 Brown con-
vened a conference across the border in Chatham, Canada, a refugee haven
for runaway slaves.29 He revealed there a draft of a new provisional gov-
ernment with himself as the commander in chief.30 His goal was to identify
other patriots opposed to slavery who were willing to join him in arming
slaves against their masters. He believed that if slaves had weapons they
would join in a campaign for their freedom.31
Details of Brown's specific plan were known only to participants and
none of them broke rank to reveal anything about the scheme.32 Brown led
twenty-one freedom fighters to capture the small federal arsenal at Harpers
Ferry in 1859. Brown hoped that other opponents of slavery, like Tubman
and Douglass, and slaves would join his crusade and that there would be
little, if any bloodshed.
The whole affair went differently. Several local people were killed as
Brown's raiders took control of small buildings near the armory. As rumors
of a slave insurrection and mass killings of whites spread throughout the
area, locals and state militia converged on the arsenal, trapping Brown.
Within a day, Brown had been captured and most of his aides were dead,
had fled to the mountains, or were captured with him.33 Two of his sons lay
dead beside him. All those captured were tried, convicted, and hanged.
B. Losing Battles, Winning Wars
The Harpers Ferry incident began and ended quickly, but Brown's leg-
acy has lived on in prose, poetry, and song. African-Americans would
praise Brown for sacrificing his life for their freedom. They would hold
conventions in his honor and his execution day, December 2, 1859, would
be a day of mourning and an annual day of remembrance.34 They would
raise funds to support Mary Brown and her children.35 They would also
dedicate monuments to their liberators in North Elba, New York. 36 In
Brown, many African-Americans saw a modern Moses, standing against
25. Act of Sept. 18,. 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat.
200.
26. Ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
27. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
28. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 70-84.
29. Id. at 43-51.
30. Id. at 46-51.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 80-82.
33. QUARLES, supra note 1, at 92-102.
34. Id. at 176-82, 192-98.
35. Id. at 144-48.
36. Id. at 188-91.
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slavery declaring, "Let my people go!"' 37 John Brown was their people.
Their fight was his fight. Brown saw slavery and its extension as evil and he
thought it was his duty to help slaves gain freedom and improve their lives.
He put aside his own comfort and security to help others.
38
Southerners labeled Brown a race traitor and sought to prove that gov-
ernment agents in the North were really behind the attack. Many in the
North, on the other hand, especially African-Americans, hailed Brown a
national hero. The battle over slavery had reached its zenith. Brown's raid
was the proverbial match that ignited the American Civil War, the deadliest
conflict in United States history. In its wake, the Union would end slavery
and restrict state power. Constitutional revisions would reshape legal sanc-
tion of colored caste. The Harpers Ferry raiders did not die in vain. They
lost their battle but won the war for justice for four million Americans of
African ancestry. Their work has been continued to this day as other Ameri-
can heroes have sought restorative justice for the nation's dispossessed. As
long as freedom rings in this world, John Brown and his Harpers Ferry com-
rades will be members of the Freedom Honor Court.
II. CITIZENS OF GOODWILL: THE SEDUCTION OF FORGETTING
Frederick Douglass taught many Americans,
Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it
never will. Find out just what any people will quietly submit to and
you have found out the exact measure of injustice and wrong which
will be imposed upon them .... The limits of tyrants are prescribed
by the endurance of those whom they oppress.39
Surely, Douglass's philosophy galvanized Brown to arm slaves. It also ex-
horted Marshall to hone his voice and demand an end to American apart-
heid. Marshall allowed no one to ignore the nation's record of inequality.
He asserted the restorative theory of equality, one that could mend the leg-
acy of discrimination. No American can excuse complicity in maintaining
caste anymore.
It is true that the nation has made progress with modest anti-
discrimination laws, but those laws only address future, isolated discrimina-
tory acts. They fail to remedy the present, cumulative effects of past dis-
crimination. They also shield cumulative privilege from legal redress. Anti-
discrimination policies need reinforcement through policies aimed at elimi-
nating accumulated caste caused by centuries of preferences for whites,
37. Exodus 5:1 (King James).
38. Id. at 184-98.
39. Frederick Douglass, West India Emancipation, Speech Delivered at Canandaigua, New York
(Aug. 4, 1857), in FREDERICK DOUGLASS, SELECrED SPEECHES AND WRrrINGS 358, 367 (Philip S.
Foner ed., 1999) (emphasis added).
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especially white men. Even if Americans cannot dismantle white privilege
because Americans will not reject whiteness, we can dismantle the caste
that centuries of white privilege have caused.n
We have been disappointed by much of the recent debate over equality
because it largely misses the importance of modem caste. Americans will
never accomplish equality of opportunity until we interpret our laws so that
no one has the right to maintain another's caste. Those who are trapped by
caste must renew their public protests and boycotts, in Washington, D.C.,
and at home, explaining to the world the injustice of American caste. Such
demonstrations and litigations must be as precise and well-planned as those
from the past. And those of us who seek to end injustice must reexamine our
opposition, mine the past, and design new judicial and legislative civil rights
strategies that will move the nation further towards eliminating caste, root
and branch. If we want equal justice under law, we must define it and estab-
lish it. It is our right to define equality contextually, taking account of his-
toric interpretations that privileged a few and disadvantaged most. It is our
duty to defeat equality theories that reify white hegemony or other axes of
caste. We agree with former Associate Justice Harry Blackmun, "We can-
not-we dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial su-
premacy."41
Caste and privilege are ubiquitous in the United States. Both are present
in our public schools, our neighborhoods, our commercial and public places,
our churches, and our social clubs. They are so extant in our society that
they are invisible, making current conditions in American life seem norma-
tive and neutral. But history reveals what A. Leon Higginbotham called
American precepts of inferiority and inequality, which operate as presump-
tions in American law. 2 Nothing prevents Americans from eliminating
caste and unfair privilege. The late Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall put
it best: "Our Constitution, whose construction began two centuries ago, can
shelter us forever from the evils of ... unchecked power .... But it cannot
protect us if we lack the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect our-
selves. ' 43
Many of us are weary from the rising opposition to recent civil rights
gains in voting, education, and employment, among other areas, especially
the misguided attack on remedial affirmative action. Just when it seemed
under-represented groups were making limited progress, our opponents be-
gan to prevail in courts and legislative councils, turning back the clock on
equal opportunity. The forces of privilege have organized to halt our march
toward equality.
40. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA 7-24 (1966).
41. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.).
42. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 195-204 (1996).
43. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
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Yet, this is no time for equality champions to rest. We have traveled far-
ther than many ever thought we could. And we have made progress without
ever becoming tyrants ourselves. We have not sought to turn the tables. We
have not advanced theories of white inferiority. We have not dehumanized
others through gross caricature or disfigurement. American legal and politi-
cal history have made whiteness an immutable plus factor, a mark of privi-
lege, which, to some extent, assists every person who is perceived as a
member of that club. And those who are deemed without the mark just as
certainly, to some extent, are diminished. Any equality jurisprudence that
fails to reform this inequality is not worth expounding.
The road ahead will also be difficult, but the moral arc of justice bends
towards equality of opportunity and we shall overcome these recent set-
backs. We must remember the quiet humility and dignity of the octogenar-
ian activist who, during the Montgomery bus boycott, eschewed admoni-
tions from the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. that she should start
riding the bus again because of her age. Her response was that she was go-
ing to walk until the boycott ended. When King insisted that she must be
tired, she replied, "Yes, my feets is tired, but my soul is rested. ' 5
Similarly, Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall's mentor,
demonstrated that it is better to die on one's feet than to live on one's
knees. 46 Marshall lived Houston's credo, serving this nation across six tur-
bulent decades until he was too ill and tired to continue. Like so many hon-
orable predecessors who overcame more formidable obstacles to equality,
civil rights advocates cannot pause now no matter how bleak the times.
A. Lessons from Our Past
Because many persons in the United States rarely celebrate the signifi-
cant historical contributions of African-Americans, in this Article, we note
several observations about future challenges to realizing equality of oppor-
tunity by referencing the life and work of a great American: the late Associ-
ate Justice Thurgood Marshall, Mr. Civil Rights. Marshall's biographers
have been at work now for over two decades putting in context his extraor-
dinary, courageous life.47 John Hope Franklin correctly praises Marshall's
Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000); Taxman v. Bd.
of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
45. HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL Is RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED
61(1978).
46. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 105-280 (1976).
47. Professor Mark V. Tushnet has done the best, most comprehensive work on Marshall to date.
See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1936-1961 (1994) [hereinafter TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW]; MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT 1961-
1991 (1997); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION
1925-1950 (1987); THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND
REMINISCENCES (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001). Tushnet's work goes far toward preserving Marshall's
place in history. Tushnet summarizes key legal arguments by Marshall in over one hundred important
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contribution to society by writing that he spoke not only "for black Ameri-
cans but for Americans of all times.
' 48
Marshall is one of our heroes, not because he was African-American or
that he rose to the top of the legal profession, but because, like John Brown,
he was a visionary leader, placing service to others above self-
aggrandizement. Like Brown, he eschewed personal wealth, championing
the causes of the powerless. He is our role model because he redirected the
sordid history of the United States. In fact, through his work he changed the
lives of all Americans. Marshall was "our people."
Marshall's constitutional vision for the United States was neither mono-
chromatic nor formalistic; equality was not an empty idea. It was broad and
majestic, permitting that charter to do for the elimination of caste what it
has done so effectively in its maintenance. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
elegantly explained, "Thurgood Marshall saved the soul of America.
4 9
Another reason for our admiration of Marshall is that he rose from
modest, segregated beginnings to make a positive difference in the lives of
millions of Americans. His life teaches that each of us has an important and
powerful voice within our control that we must lift. As one of Marshall's
colleagues on the Court reminds us, "His life as a private lawyer belies the
suggestion that individual attorneys working in the private sector cannot
make a profound difference in the direction of the law. 5° We have decided
to use our voices to fight against policies that promote caste and unfair
privilege, hoping in some small way to continue the work so gallantly per-
formed by Marshall and many others. We intend to do all that we can to see
that our children and grandchildren do not live lives confined by caste.
51
cases spanning his time on the Court. Because Marshall wrote some eight hundred opinions, there re-
mains more work to be done. For other recent biographical studies of Marshall's life, see RANDALL W.
BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW (1973); MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER CLARK,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH (1992); ROGER GOLDMAN &
DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL (1992); CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS,
DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993); JUAN WILLIAMS,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998).
48. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARv. L. REV. 55, 56
(1991) (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 7, 1990, at 12, 15).
49. Id. at 62.
50. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (1992).
51. See generally BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY: COLORBLINDNESS AND THE
END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997); Bryan K. Fair, The Acontextual Illusion of a Color-Blind Consti-
tution, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 343 (1994) (reviewing ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
(1992)); Bryan K. Fair, America's Equality Promise: Can You Tell Me Where It's Gone?, 18 J. OF AM.
ETHNIC HIST. 167 (1999) (reviewing CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS
SINCE WORLD WAR II (John Higham ed., 1997)); Bryan K. Fair, America's Equality Promise: Where Do
We Go From Here?, 19 J. OF AM. ETHNIC HIST. 90 (1999) (reviewing STEPHAN & ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997)); Bryan K. Fair, The
Anatomy of American Caste, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 381 (1999); Bryan K. Fair, Been in the
Storm Too Long, Without Redemption: What We Must Do Next, 25 S.U. L. REV. 121 (1997) [hereinafter
Fair, Been in the Storm]; Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 1 (1993); Bryan K. Fair, How Far We Have to Go, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 318 (1988) (re-
viewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987));
Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution and Wrongful
Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403 (1994); U.W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Making Bricks
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We also admire Marshall because he dealt with the law as it operates in
the real world, with a keen view of those forced to the bottom of society.
Marshall knew firsthand America's underclass, its outsiders. To them, he
was their lawyer, Mr. Civil Rights. He, like few other Justices, wrote about
the law's impact on the lives of real people, those who were poor, illiterate,
and defenseless. His greatest aspiration and achievement was to eliminate
the public color disability, no small achievement in a land built on a policy
of white racial privilege. Marshall knew that this nation's policy of racial
supremacy was a disease, preventing it from realizing its potential and hin-
dering its nationhood.52 His genius was an advocacy that made the sickness
of racial superiority apparent to an all-white Supreme Court.
B. The Character of Color
Tragically, Marshall's color shades the ability of many Americans to
celebrate his life and honor his dedication to the rule of law and the elimina-
tion of caste. It still appears nearly impossible for many whites to see Afri-
can-Americans as American heroes, rather than more narrowly as black
heroes or leaders. But who can deny that Marshall's life merits as much
praise and tribute as George Washington's, Thomas Jefferson's, or Abra-
ham Lincoln's? Why do Americans honor former slaveowners and racial
supremacists, yet marginalize great civil rights/public interest lawyers in our
history through simple obscurity? Commentators must not allow what hap-
pened to Charles Houston to happen to Marshall and other modem legal
giants.
Civil rights strategists can learn much from Marshall's courageous ex-
ample as we carry on his cause to make equality of opportunity a reality for
all Americans. One important lesson is that one does not have to be rich or
famous to contribute to the fight against caste. Marshall had neither fame
nor wealth when he began his remarkable journey. Marshall was signifi-
cantly unknown when he argued in the school desegregation cases that offi-
cials in those cases had enacted irrational legislation, policies with only one
possible meaning-blacks, because of their race, were unfit to associate
with whites. Marshall became famous because he had the temerity to imag-
Without Straw: The NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Development of Civil Rights Law in Alabama
1940-1980, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1121 (2001).
52. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1, 2, 5 (1987). Marshall, on his reluctance to celebrate the Constitution's bicentennial, said:
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was
forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and
sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the govem-
ment they devised was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war,
and momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and
its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.
Id. at2.
53. For a fascinating study of black lawyers in the United States, see J. CLAY SMITH,
EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 (1993).
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ine that he could make a difference in the lives of many Americans through
the legal system. He became famous because he tenaciously attacked both
sophisticated and simple-minded discriminatory policies.
54
A second lesson is that our struggle to eliminate caste will take time,
perhaps several generations. Marshall's life demonstrates what can be ac-
complished over time. DuBois's color line did not fall without resistance. It
was a long, slow road to victory. It took John Brown, Frederick Douglass,
Harriett Tubman, Charles Sumner, Susan Anthony, W.E.B. DuBois, Eliza-
beth Stanton, Charles Houston, William Hastie, and many others to prepare
a road for Thurgood Marshall. Marshall and others had to prove separate
was not equal. They had to prove that states would not equalize separate
facilities because the costs were too great. Then, they had to prove that
state-sponsored segregation was itself unconstitutional because of the
stigma it imposed on black children and because of the unfair privilege it
conferred on white children.
While we eschew gradualism, we realize that this fight will require
more time. Our fight to eliminate systemic inequality will present similar
obstacles and it necessitates an assault on caste and privilege. Both must be
undone.55 To eliminate caste and privilege, we must demonstrate the exis-
tence of each and how they were created; then, we must prove that caste and
privilege violate the Constitution; finally, we must prove that government
can eliminate caste and unfair privilege without violating anyone's constitu-
tional rights.
Another lesson Marshall taught civil rights advocates is that we must
accomplish relief through changes in the law (both through the legislatures
and the courts) and that division weakens us. Marshall was a fierce defender
of the rule of law. For him, change was possible through legislation and
judicial decisions. Whatever else we do, we must continue to use the rules
to accomplish our goals and seek to change rules that impede us. Moreover,
Marshall believed that one must use the best help one could find to prepare
legal challenges. Collaboration between lawyers, educators, historians, so-
ciologists, and others won the segregation cases. Those who fight against
caste must use strength in numbers and resources, bridging traditional di-
vides, to remake this country, town by town, child by child. Marshall never
refused the assistance of others supporting his cause; our progress depends
on persuading others that eliminating caste is in their best interest.
One of our greatest obstacles is explaining to those most ensconced in
privilege that they, too, would be better off if we eliminated caste. How so?
We must explain that caste necessitates social welfare. Caste causes societal
harm through secondary effects such as crime, violence, drug abuse, and
54. THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND
REMINISCENCES, supra note 47, at 69. Marshall documents the tortuous schemes adopted in Oklahoma,
Maryland, Texas, and other states to prevent African-Americans from voting, registering, or participat-
ing in primaries. Id. passim.
55. WILDMAN, supra note 40, at 12-24.
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poverty. Therefore, eliminating caste can help people to better fend for
themselves.
Yet another lesson from Marshall's work is that we must appeal for
support to all who experience caste and not focus solely on one form.
Through our active, combined civil disobedience, we must make it clear that
we will no longer accept caste or unfair privilege for anyone. We cannot go
back to "separate but [un]equal."
Marshall's life also teaches that conviction to one's cause is an indis-
pensable element for success. Equality advocates need to be more commit-
ted than ever if we are to eliminate caste. As Cass Sunstein reminds us,
In Marshall's constitutional vision, this commitment entailed, first
and foremost, a right to equal prospects in education. But it also re-
quired more generally an opposition to all caste systems-
understood as second-class citizenship, in which one group is sys-
tematically below others on the basis of a morally irrelevant factor
such as race, sex, or disability.56
Many suggest that they support the elimination of caste, but they are not
willing to endure any personal loss. That is not possible. We cannot elimi-
nate caste and maintain unfair privilege. To accomplish the former, we must
diminish the latter.
Another important lesson is that snakes come in all sizes, shapes, and
colors. W.E.B. DuBois used to say that blacks do not need black schools or
white schools-they need educationally effective schools.57 Similarly, when
future nominations are presented for the Court, we must remind the presi-
dent and the Senate that we do not need black justices or women justices,
we need only justices who believe that the Constitution neither knows nor
tolerates caste. 58 This generation of civil rights advocates must persuade the
Court to adopt an anti-caste meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.59
Finally, Marshall taught us that the United States does not have a race
or gender problem. It does not need a conversation on race or gender.
Rather, it needs a conversation on its romance with white, male supremacy.
Anything short of a conversation on unfair privilege and caste largely
misses the point. Americans must be taught the fallacy of race and gender
supremacy, no matter who espouses them, and we must have a conversation
on the constitutional difference between policies promoting supremacy and
policies eliminating caste. Equality champions must ensure that our courts
56. Cass R. Sunstein, On Marshall's Conception of Equality, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1992).
57. W.E.B. DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935)
(quoted in DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 120-21 (1987)).
58. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558-59 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Cf. Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 503-27 (2003) (asserting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause might provide a more likely source for reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
under the vision of the abolitionists).
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interpret equality so that laws can be used to eliminate subordination and
unfair privilege.
We comment on these lessons more fully below in the context of Mar-
shall's life.
III. MARSHALL'S LAW: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
A. Making a Difference
Marshall was eighty-four years old when he died on January 24, 1993.60
He was simply worn out from a life and legal career that spanned most of
the twentieth century. He held several of this country's highest legal posi-
tions, including federal Circuit Court judge, solicitor general, and Justice of
the Supreme Court for twenty-four terms, retiring in June 1991.
But Marshall was a giant in law long before his appointment to the
Court, having served for approximately a quarter century as the top lawyer
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP). In that role, Marshall became Howard University Law School's
most successful graduate, using the law and legal system to force the United
States to repudiate its endorsement of white, male supremacy. He learned
well at the knee of Charles Houston, William Hastie, and other outstanding
Howard faculty.
61
We have chosen Marshall's life for discussion because it is a model for
62all of us about living a life that matters in this new century. As much as
any other lawyer or Supreme Court Justice in our history, Marshall under-
stood the generative power of the Constitution. He believed that as an advo-
cate, statesman, or jurist one could use constitutional principles, especially
the Fourteenth Amendment, to end American apartheid. But Marshall saw
in the Constitution a cure for more than Jim Crow caste. It was a source of
hope for other minorities, women, the poor, the criminally accused, and
others relegated by caste. Marshall used law to serve the underdog. Thus,
Marshall's life is a window on the best and worst of our nation's history. It
is also a portrait of an American hero. He fought for sixty years to eliminate
America's color line and rigid, systemic caste. He accomplished the first
goal; the second remains for us to complete.
60. Joan Biskupic, Thurgood Marshall, Retired Justice, Dies, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1993, at At.
61. KLUGER, supra note 46, at 179-238.
62. For a sample of the numerous tributes to Justice Marshall, see Memorials, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
205 (1993); Special Issue Honoring Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1992); Sympo-
sium, Brown v. Board of Education and its Legacy: A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1992); Symposium, The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood Marshall, 47
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1994); Thurgood Marshall Commemorative Issue, A Tribute from Friends and Col-
leagues, 35 How. L.J. 1 (1991); Tributes, 2 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1993); Tributes, 105
HARv. L. REV. 23 (1991); Tributes, 101 YALE L.J. 1 (1991).
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1. Doing What You Can with What You Have
One challenge to civil rights advancements in the future is fostering a
belief that we individually can do something that matters. Many Americans
live as if we cannot make a difference. We recognize caste, the huge dis-
parities in the lives of different Americans, but see ourselves as powerless to
effect change. More than simply weary, equality advocates appear hopeless,
perceiving caste as permanent or intractable. Our inaction worsens the caste
system we aim to eliminate, while deepening the despair endured by so
many persons.
Americans are so fortunate that Marshall did not think or live that way.
Although he was born in 1908 in segregated Baltimore, Maryland, and even
though both sides of his family knew slavery firsthand, Marshall dreamed
that he could make a difference-and so he did. Marshall's father was a
Pullman porter and then a steward at an exclusive, all white yacht club; his
mother was an elementary school teacher who stressed education.63 Mar-
shall described his childhood as comfortable, but limited by a rigid color
line.64
Too often we forget how segregated this nation was only a few years
ago. To be an American with darker skin during most of the twentieth cen-
tury meant that by law and custom one was not a full citizen. It meant one
could not vote, attend most public schools and colleges without reference to
race, lease or purchase property on the same terms or in the same areas as
whites, use interstate transportation without the degradation of taking a rear
seat or giving up your seat to a white traveler.65 Regarding employment,
only a few occupations or industries were open to many Americans, and
even then, there was no guarantee that the employee of color would earn the
same pay as his or her white male counterpart.66
For African-Americans and other second-class citizens the United
States was a cruel paradox: the nation's written principles of fairness, equal-
ity, and due process were antithetical to the reality of privilege and caste.
Equality of opportunity was a lie. Thus, Marshall and others matured in the
face of sharp occupational segregation, poll taxes, literacy tests, all white
primaries, segregated public accommodations, racially-restrictive residential
covenants, race riots, and lynching. 67 Those who did not keep their place
risked public and private reprisals from the big mules and their lackeys.68
63. See BLAND, supra note 47, at 3-4; ROWAN, supra note 47, at 33-34.
64. See BLAND, supra note 47, at 4; ROWAN, supra note 47, at 3-21.
65. See FAIR, supra note 51, at 103-20.
66. See id.; see also JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S.
WOMEN 192-228 (1991); DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 114-47 (1991).
67. FAIR, supra note 51, at 105; see also ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND:
THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION (2002) (examining the
Tulsa race riot of 1921).
68. Diane McWhorter has elegantly described this lethal combination in her Pulitzer Prize winning
book on the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in which four young girls were murdered.
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Marshall, of course, had the last laugh as he directed a diverse team of
legal experts between the 1930s and 1960s to halt most of these longstand-
ing white preferences. 69 Civil rights strategists today do not have to over-
come Dred Scott and a denial of citizenship. 70 We do not have Plessy and
the doctrine of separate but equal to surmount.7 1 We do not face the vio-
lence, the lynching, the intimidation, and humiliation confronted daily by
those on whose shoulders we stand. But many Americans do face much
prejudice and discrimination and deepening caste. So no one who seeks
change can rest. Even if you mentor one person out of caste or if you make
one person aware of unfair privilege, you make an important contribution.
Marshall and other equality champions demonstrated extraordinary
courage, putting their lives on the line every day to lessen the obstacles that
we now face. Their example is clear. We must do what we can with what
we have, never forgetting that the challenges we face pale in comparison to
those faced by Marshall's generation. If we prepare and dedicate ourselves
the way they did, no group can prevent our elimination of caste and unfair
privilege.
2. We Must See that Our Children Gain Equal
Educational Opportunities
For most Americans, it remains true that the only way up from caste is
through education. And if America is disuniting or slouching towards ruin,
it is not because of a crisis in traditional family values or the loss of gov-
ernment-led school prayer. Rather, the decline of this nation is the result of
its persistent neglect of most of its citizens. We have done a poor job of
training many Americans to become productive, independent citizens.
Enormous privileges for a few have meant significant deprivations for most.
One core value of the early desegregation cases was that the denial of
education was tantamount to relegating those so denied to civil and legal
inferiority. Thurgood Marshall's public education occurred in segregated,
inferior schools; because of his color, he was presumed unfit to attend
schools with white children in Baltimore and white students at the Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law. Sarah Roberts had suffered this same in-
dignity in Boston in 1850,72 as did Linda Brown a century later in Topeka.
73
This was the lot of millions of American children born into the disfavored
racial classification and deemed unfit for full citizenship and effective edu-
cational opportunity. Marshall convinced the Supreme Court that the prob-
See generally DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, THE CLIMACTIC
BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2001).
69. For a summary of cases Marshall argued before the Supreme Court, see BLAND, supra note 47,
at 183-84. See also TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 47.
70. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
71. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
72. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198 (1850).
73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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lem was not with the colored students. They had done nothing wrong, nor
were they innately deficient. Their inadequacy was not of their creation, but
the result of state-sanctioned preferences for whites.
Marshall reported that he first read sections of the United States Consti-
tution as punishment for misbehaving in school.74 By the time he finished
Frederick Douglass High School, he had memorized the entire Constitu-
tion.75 Marshall attended college at Lincoln University, a prestigious, all-
male, all-black college near Chester, Pennsylvania.76 He was a member of
the debate team, various athletic teams, and Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity.77 In
his sophomore year, Marshall was expelled along with twenty-two other
students for hazing.78 He returned to Lincoln a more serious student and
graduated with honors in 1930.
79
In the fall of 1930, Marshall was denied admission at the University of
Maryland School of Law solely because of his race.80 Maryland did not
admit any African-Americans. The distinctions between such policies and
modern diversity policies are apparent. No university in the United States
has policies excluding all whites or any individual solely because of that
racial classification. American institutions simply are not anti-white. They
never have been.
Marshall could do nothing about Maryland's policy. The Court's deci-
sions were against him. Instead, he attended Howard University School of
Law where he began his association with Charles Houston, William Hastie,
and George Hayes, all members of the Howard Law Faculty at that time.
Houston was also the Vice-Dean and he insisted that Howard law graduates
use the law as social engineers. He believed that the principal mission of
Howard was to train outstanding black lawyers who would lead the legal
attack against segregation and inequality in America. Marshall was Hous-
ton's most successful protdg6. He was diligent, graduating first in his class
in 1933.81
Marshall's educational story is important for several reasons. First,
imagine if Marshall had not been educated at all. Would it not have been an
extraordinary waste of talent? Is it not counterproductive to undereducate
any person, unless, of course, you want to keep them in caste? How much
does undereducation cost the nation? In a passage that Marshall particularly
liked to quote, the Court said:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
74. ROWAN, supra note 47, at 35.
75. See id. at 42-44.
76. ld. at 42.
77. See BLAND, supra note 47, at 5.
78. Id.
79. See ROWAN, supra note 47, at 45.
80. Id. at 45-46.
81. BLAND, supra note 47, at 7.
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great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is re-
quired in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional train-
ing, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
82
Marshall's education also speaks volumes about the important role of
historically black schools and colleges in this nation's rhetoric of equal op-
portunity. The fact is that but for historically black colleges, many blacks
would have had no educational opportunity because so many schools were
for whites only. Fortunately, Marshall attended two educationally-effective
historically black schools, where he learned how to fight caste. The signifi-
cant role of such schools in this society cannot be gainsaid.
Yet, the work is not complete. After five decades of lively litigation,
equal educational opportunities and educationally effective schools remain
elusive for many Americans. While advocates must be vigilant that green no
longer follows white, we must go a further step: We must establish a consti-
tutional right to adequate and equitable education. 83 Is not education an in-
dispensable right without which all others are diminished? Without it, can
one truly realize other constitutional rights?84 If we are to eliminate caste,
our best staffed, best equipped schools must become the baseline for all
American children. And we must supplement improved schools with com-
munity- and home-based resources that will make it possible for more of
our children to pursue advanced education.
3. The End We Seek Is Not an Empty Idea
While many great figures participated in the American struggle for civil
rights and civil liberties, none was more important than Thurgood Marshall.
Solicitor General Drew Days is right when he says,
His dedication to the living Constitution and legal institutions of
America kept him focused on the importance of individual rights
and liberties, not only for African-Americans, but also for women,
the poor, and other under-represented people. During his lifetime
Thurgood Marshall dominated the legal landscape, tenaciously
82. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1267-68 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
83. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 111-17.
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pushing race relations along the path of equality in courtrooms,
classrooms, and corporate boardrooms.85
After graduating from law school, Marshall joined the Maryland Bar
86Association and opened a small law office in Baltimore. He quickly
earned an excellent reputation as a civil rights advocate, but too much of his
work was for no fee.87 Marshall became counsel for the Baltimore NAACP
in 1934, and in that capacity he persuaded a Maryland appellate court that
the University of Maryland's exclusion of Donald Murray from the law
school was unconstitutional.88 In 1936, Charles Houston recruited Marshall
to join the legal staff of the NAACP in New York.89 Two years later, Mar-
shall succeeded Houston as chief counsel. 90 Mark Tushnet, a former Mar-
shall clerk, has properly described his former boss as one of the nation's
first and most prominent public interest lawyers. 9'
For a quarter-century, between 1938 and 1961, Marshall was the princi-
pal architect of the legal strategy to end official, state-sponsored segregation
in the United States. 92 Marshall guided some of the greatest legal talent ever
assembled, including Constance Baker Motley, James Nabrit, Jr., Arthur
Davis Shores, Juanita Mitchell, Oliver Hill, Robert L. Carter, Jack Green-
berg, Wiley Branton, Roy Wilkins, Charles L. Black, Jr., and George Hayes,
among many others, and accomplished what many thought was impossi-
ble.
93
Under Marshall's leadership, the NAACP, and after 1940, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF), the nonprofit agency created
by Marshall to finance desegregation litigation, attacked every form of seg-
regation in the United States. 94 For example, in Smith v. Allright95 they at-
tacked the all white Democratic primaries throughout the South that denied
blacks their right to vote; in Shelley v. Kramer9 and Hurd v. Hodge97 they
challenged the enforcement of racially-restrictive covenants in real estate
transactions which prevented blacks from living in certain communities;
they also challenged segregation in interstate transportation. 98 Donald
85. Resolution Presented by the Solicitor General, Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United
States in Memory of Justice Marshall, 510 U.S. v, vi (Nov. 15, 1993).
86. See ROWAN, supra note 47, at 47-49.
87. Id.
88. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
89. ROWAN, supra note 47, at 70.
90. See BLAND, supra note 47, at 181-82, for tables of cases argued by the lawyers of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. before the Supreme Court.
91. See sources cited supra note 47; see also Mark V. Tushnet, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall: Lawyer Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1277 (1992).
92. See BLAND, supra note 47, at 116.
93. See ROWAN, supra note 47, at 182-219.
94. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631
(1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
95. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
96. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
97. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
98. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
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Gaines, Ada Sipuel, and Heman Sweatt were all aided by Marshall and LDF
when Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas denied them equal protection of the
law.
99
Marshall was the lawyer for Autherine Lucy and Polly Anne Myers in
their challenge against The University of Alabama's policy of segrega-
tion.1°° He was also instrumental in persuading the Supreme Court that seg-
regation in bus transportation in Montgomery was unconstitutional.' 01 The
significance of these hard-won legal victories cannot be overstated. Mar-
shall and LDF staff lawyers and volunteers used public education and litiga-
tion to demonstrate the embarrassment, shame, and unfairness of Jim Crow
laws in a country which had recently fought a war over and ridiculed theo-
ries of racial supremacy abroad.
Marshall's greatest court victory came on May 17, 1954, when the
United States Supreme Court agreed that segregated public schools were
unconstitutional notwithstanding the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson.10 2 In Brown v. Board of Education,10 3 Marshall convinced the
Court that de jure segregated schools were inherently unequal and therefore
unconstitutional. °4 Here, Marshall displayed his brilliance as a legal strate-
gist. Having spent nearly twenty-five years showing the Court that separate
but equal was folly, Marshall took on segregation itself. He reiterated argu-
ments from Sipuel, Gaines, and Sweatt that in segregated schools neither the
tangibles nor the intangibles were equal. °5 He added that segregation
caused substantial harm to all children, especially black children who were
stamped with a badge of inferiority.0 6 Thus, Marshall linked state-
sponsored segregation with the maintenance of racial caste.
In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court
gave notice that segregation in public affairs would end. 0 7 Warren wrote
that racial separation generated a feeling of inferiority as to the black chil-
dren's status in the community and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 10 8 Our inference from Warren's stated premise is that he also real-
99. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 590 (Md. 1936).
100. Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955). For an insider's view of the events leading to the desegrega-
tion of The University of Alabama, see E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR:
SEGREGATION'S LAST STAND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA (1993).
101. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (ending segrega-
tion in municipal transportation); see also Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (ending segregation in
municipal auditoriums); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (ending segregation in courtrooms);
State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (ending segregation in athletic contests); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (ending segregation at public golf
courses and parks); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (ending segregation at municipal golf
courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (ending segregation at public beaches and
bathhouses).
102. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
105. Id. at 491-92.
106. Id. at 493-94.
107. Id. at 483.
108. Id. at 495.
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ized that such separation generated in white children a feeling of superiority
as to their status in the community. That should have been another constitu-
tional basis for invalidating the segregation statutes.'
°9
Brown was severely criticized in part because the Court accepted socio-
logical data as proof of the harm of segregation on black children." ° For
Herbert Wechsler, the question before the Court was essentially a freedom
of association conflict between those seeking to maintain segregation and
those seeking to compel desegregation."' This criticism seems misguided,
for the opinion clearly sets forth that segregation in public education vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" 2 Also, it
would seem that private associational rights would not allow the state to
approve discrimination in public schools.
Our chief criticism of the Court in Brown is that it did not identify an
obvious racial privilege to whites for what it was. Whites have no constitu-
tional right to use the power of the state to maintain racial caste of others.
The Court should have spelled this out more directly. Had it been more ex-
plicit about Brown's anti-caste meaning, its legacy would be far more se-
cure than it appears today.
We have Marshall's parents and his teachers/mentors to thank for his
many talents, and we have him to thank for giving his life to the cause of
equality. Paul Gewirtz has written of Marshall,
He was the country's greatest civil rights lawyer during the greatest
period for civil rights advances in our history, and in that role he
lived a life of relentless intensity and danger, and one of transform-
ing achievement....
... Thurgood Marshall had the capacity to imagine a radically
different world, the imaginative capacity to believe that such a
world was possible, the strength to sustain that image in the mind's
eye and the heart's longing, and the courage and ability to make the
imagined world real. The predicate for the great achievement of
Brown was to imagine something better than the present-to resist
the acquiescence, passivity, fear, and accommodation that over-
109. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). To our knowledge, Loving is the only Supreme Court
decision in which the Court's rationale makes clear that state laws cannot endorse white supremacy.
110. Perhaps the most famous criticism came from Herbert Wechsler. Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Professor Wechsler, implying that
the reasoning of the Brown decision was not principled, wrote,
A principled decision .. . is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is in-
volved. When no sufficient reasons of the this kind can be assigned for overturning value
choices of the other branches of the Government or of a state, those choices must, of course,
survive.
Id. at 19.
111. Id. at 34.
112. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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come so many, to defy an insistent reality with imagination and
then to fight for what was imagined."
3
Brown's legacy is barely a shadow of the opinion and the hope it en-
gendered for better educational opportunities, especially for colored chil-
dren. For nearly two decades the school cases were actively resisted and
nullified. And by the mid-1970s, a new Court majority had lost its will to
command compliance with a policy it did not support. 14 The Constitution
did not change, only the Court's interpretation of equal protection. For the
new Court equality means little for America's second classes. Lost through
this process was another two generations of children without effective edu-
cational opportunity, without real prospects for their lives. As we revise
civil rights strategies, we must reclaim the anti-caste meaning of Brown and
related cases. We must see that the Court defines equality of opportunity in
a substantive way, one that will allow government to eliminate caste, in all
its forms.
B. Strategies for the Future
Although Marshall has left us, he did not depart without leaving a
wealth of thought from which we can draw direction and inspiration. Mar-
shall had two exceptional careers and we must mine each for his wise coun-
sel. After Marshall's brilliant career with the LDF, President John F. Ken-
nedy nominated Marshall to serve on the distinguished United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1962-1965). He then served two years as
the United States Solicitor General, before President Lyndon B. Johnson
nominated him to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967."'
Marshall was not on the Court long before his views on constitutional
questions were relegated significantly to dissenting opinions. Yet scholars
have yet to study Marshall's writing comprehensively, especially his dis-
sents. Few, if any, former Justices have the legacy of Thurgood Marshall.
We hope that more scholars will join us as we begin mining his opinions,
seeking to re-center the generative power of the modem Constitution.
Although we cannot treat Marshall's complete jurisprudence in this Ar-
ticle, there is much to assess. In cases in which it appeared the police abused
their power to extract a confession from an accused murderer, Marshall held
firm to the principle that involuntary confessions should not be admissi-
ble." 6 Even in capital murder cases, Marshall did not shirk his duty. He
simply would not countenance police misconduct, such as coercively ques-
tioning a fifteen-year-old boy over the course of several days, for long peri-
113. Paul Gewirtz, Thurgood Marshall, 101 YALE L.J. 13, 13-14 (1991).
114. Fair, Been in the Storm, supra note 51, at 131-37.
115. For a discussion of Johnson's appointment of Marshall to serve as solicitor general, see ROWAN,
supra note 47, at 289-92; to the Supreme Court, ROWAN, supra note 47, at 286-89, 296.
116. See Johnson v. Massachusetts, 390 U.S. 511, 512-15 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ods of time. 1 7 Marshall was a selective incorporationist who insisted that
rights deemed fundamental under the Constitution should serve as limits on
state and federal government. 118
Marshall broke with others on the Court to oppose police misconduct or
poor lawyering that had disadvantaged a criminal defendant. He supported
the rights of all criminally accused persons to full constitutional rights. For
Marshall, every person "is entitled to a trial in which he is fully accorded his
constitutional guarantee of the right to confront and cross-examine all the
witnesses against him."'"19 Marshall also resisted efforts within the Court to
weaken the scope of protections embraced by the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. For Marshall, the Fifth Amendment pro-
vided a witness an absolute right to resist interrogation if the testimony
sought would tend to incriminate him. Marshall championed a broad guar-
antee that before the government would compel a witness to testify, it must
give the witness immunity from prosecution for crimes to which his testi-
mony relates.12
0
Marshall's constitutional vision was usually broader than most of his
Court colleagues. For example, Marshall believed the Constitution guaran-
teed criminal defendants an impartial jury. Thus, in cases where his col-
leagues agreed that a trial judge was constitutionally required to inquire
during voir dire about racial prejudice among potential jurors, Marshall dis-
sented in part, explaining why the trial judge could not totally foreclose
other reasonable and relevant avenues of inquiry as to possible prejudice.'21
In Marshall's view, the right to impartiality and fairness did not protect
against only certain classes of prejudice. 1
22
Marshall battled an increasingly conservative Court to retain minimum
constitutional standards before the government violated the due process
rights of the criminally accused, No matter how heinous the crime, Marshall
was fastidious in his requirement that government agents conduct them-
selves consistent with constitutional safeguards. 23 He was unwilling to en-
dorse Court opinions that deferred to broad governmental discretion.
24
117. Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71, 72 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 100-11 (1970).
119. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 111; see also Dukes v. Connecticut, 406 U.S. 250, 259-71 (1972) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (explaining the serious consequences of guilty pleas and his inclination to permit crimi-
nally accused persons to withdraw such pleas).
120. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,467-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 530-34 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
122. Ham, 409U.S. at531.
123. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., separate concurrence)
(expressing the view that preemptory strikes of jurors should be eliminated because of substantial risk of
racial bias); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 906-16 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing col-
leagues for endorsing summary procedures in capital punishment cases); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 153-62 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (protesting arbitrary police conduct against citizens).
124. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420,429-34 (1984) (Marshall, J., opposing exception
to Miranda requirements as sending an unclear message to police); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
406-14 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (rejecting a good faith exception to Miranda).
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Therefore, Marshall could not join the Court's opinion endorsing nighttime
searches in narcotics cases. 25 For Marshall, there was "no expectation of
privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional protection
than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes
during the night. 1 26 He concluded that nighttime searches require an addi-
tional showing of justification over and above probable cause.
127
Marshall opposed government policies that stripped the criminally ac-
cused of all constitutional rights. Thus, when states sought to enforce voting
restrictions on ex-felons, Marshall would have no part in it.128 Marshall
pointed out that almost half the states provided for the restoration of ex-
felons' voting rights upon completion of sentence or release from parole or
probation. 129
In addition, Marshall was there to protect privacy rights, especially of
women seeking to determine whether to bear a child. 130 He was there to
explain why Allan Bakke was not a victim of invidious, reverse discrimina-
tion.' 3' Marshall was a voice for the grandmother who was threatened with
jail for allowing her grandsons to live with her in public housing. 32 He was
present to defend the right to marry against a state policy that few, if any,
persons could satisfy. 133 Furthermore, Marshall explained to his colleagues
the difference between special preferences for whites and remedial affirma-
tive action.134 He supported federal and state laws designed to ameliorate
American apartheid. He endorsed broad equitable powers of judges seeking
to remedy constitutional violations by school districts, including imposing
interdistrict remedies where appropriate.' 35 His constitutional vision was
trenchant, having been shaped by years of battle.
Few, if any, of the members of the Court, before or since, could boast
Marshall's relevant experience. Indeed, President Johnson said of Marshall,
"I believe he has already earned his place in history.... but I think it will be
greatly enhanced by his service on the Court."'1 3 6 Nonetheless, as had been
the case with his nomination to the Second Circuit, Marshall's qualifications
were questioned, primarily by southern white senators. 37 Marshall suffered
125. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974).
126. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 462.
127. Id. at 464.
128. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 84-85 (1974).
129. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 84-85.
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
131. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
132. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
133. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
135. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
136. Roy Reed, Marshall Named for High Court, Its First Negro, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1967, at Al.
137. See RowAN, supra note 47, at 298-308. For an insightful discussion of the year-long ordeal
Marshall faced when nominated for the Second Circuit, see Richard L. Revesz, Thurgood Marshall's
Struggle, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1993).
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this humiliation with grace. He knew that he was amply qualified and he
proved his naysayers wrong.
As an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court between 1967 and 1991,
Marshall used the Constitution as a sword and the rule of law as a shield to
change our society. Justice Marshall's constitutional vision was broad. He
was an advocate for the poor, the criminally accused, minorities, and always
opposed the death penalty. Marshall supported reproductive freedom and
equal pay for women. He believed the Constitution protected broad privacy
interests including familial privacy, the right to read and see materials that
might be objectionable to others, and the right to choose a partner of the
same sex without discrimination. His opinions brought constitutional ideal
and reality together. We must see that Marshall's work is not lost to obscu-
rity.
IV. CONCLUSION
We salute Marshall as we mark the tenth anniversary of his death. Like
John Brown, Marshall's spirit goes marching on. Judge Robert L. Carter, a
friend and colleague of Marshall's, aptly reminds us of Marshall's signifi-
cance:
The pride and dignity that Thurgood Marshall has inspired in
the black community over his long career is paralleled only by the
very real, enormous contribution he has made in ensuring that black
Americans enjoy equality of citizenship. But the most lasting im-
print he leaves is more far-reaching. Marshall's steadfast belief in
the Constitution as the pillar of democratic and egalitarian princi-
ples and in law generally as the protector of the poor and power-
less-and his efforts toward the realization of these ideals-
reminds the American people as a whole of their vast potential for
social progress.' 
38
Martha Minow, a former Marshall clerk, deftly recalls how Marshall
continuously reminded other members of the Court about the context of the
lives of litigants, especially through compelling dissenting opinions. 139 Mar-
shall knew firsthand the status of the outsider, and we must carefully exam-
ine each of his nearly four hundred dissents for arguments against caste.
Those dissents contain rare jewels for civil rights lawyers that we must har-
vest.
Similarly, the late Associate Justice William Brennan, Marshall's clos-
est friend on the Court, wrote,
138. Robert L. Carter, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARv. L. REV. 33, 42 (1991).
139. Martha Minow, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 66 (1991); see also
Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2093 (1992).
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What made Thurgood Marshall unique as a Justice? Above all,
it was the special voice that he added to the Court's deliberations
and decisions. His was a voice of authority: he spoke from first-
hand knowledge of the law's failure to fulfill its promised protec-
tions for so many Americans. It was also the voice of reason, for
Justice Marshall had spent half a lifetime using the tools of legal ar-
gument to close the gap between constitutional ideal and reality.
1 40
Owen Fiss has recalled one story about Marshall's knowing when to
move on:
[Marshall was in a small Mississippi town] out there on the train
platform, trying to look small, when this cold-eyed man with a gun
on his hip came up. "Nigguh," he said, "I thought you oughta know
the sun ain't nevah set on a live nigguh in this town." So [Marshall]
wrapped [his] constitutional rights in cellophane, tucked them in
[his] hip pocket-and caught the next train.1
41
Justice Marshall often used stories from his life to explain the law's failure
to fulfill the Constitution's promised protections for so many Americans.
For twenty-four years Marshall was the conscience of the Supreme Court.
Justice Marshall's legacy is a challenge to each of us. It is a challenge to
envision a better social order free of caste. It is also a challenge to live lives
of service. Marshall's life is an example of what we too might do to im-
prove our society for the better. Marshall was an inspiration to judges, law-
yers, and law teachers such as Damon Keith, Thomas McMillian, A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., Nathaniel Jones, William Coleman, Jr., Juanita Jackson
Mitchell, Wade McCree, Spottswood Robinson, and Constance Baker Mot-
ley, among many other accomplished citizens. Marshall's legacy is an inspi-
ration to us personally to live greatly in the law or fail in our attempt. 1
42
William Coleman, Jr. has asserted that Marshall is among the very few
Americans who have made a significant difference in the quality of life for
all people in our nation. Writing to Marshall, he states:1
43
You have performed your task with great style and in a way that has
made the law a grander calling. Thanks so much for greatly improv-
ing the quality of our laws, the vision of our country, and the hope
that the youth may yet enjoy the blessings of liberty without the
140. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23, 23
(1991).
141. Owen Fiss, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 49, 53 (1991).
142. See Wechsler, supra note 110, at 35.
143. William T. Coleman, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 42, 42
(1991).
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burdens of unfair restrictions imposed by the color of their skin,
their gender, or their poverty.'"
No truer words have been spoken. And we agree with Fiss, another Mar-
shall clerk, who wrote in tribute that as long as there is law, Justice Thur-
good Marshall's name will be remembered as one of its giants.1 4' Finally,
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. was correct when he wrote that "the greatest
tribute to Thurgood Marshall would be to live as he lived"-fighting
caste. 
146
On his retirement in 1991, Justice Marshall was asked how he wished to
be remembered. He replied, "That he did what he could with what he
had.' 47 We owe Justice Marshall an enormous debt. Without Marshall, we
doubt that many Americans of color and white women could have pro-
gressed to become judges, lawyers, or law teachers. But for his work, our
lives too, might still be defined officially by color or gender, as was the case
for so many generations of Americans. We, as grateful Americans of color,
do not have to drink at colored water fountains, or use colored toilets, or
colored waiting rooms. We do not have to attend dilapidated, segregated
schools. We do not have to ride in the back of the bus or sit in special sec-
tions of theaters or other public accommodations. We are not turned away
from lunch counters. We do not have to endure the same level of violent
attacks, racial epithets, or other forms of humiliation because Marshall
changed our society.
If Marshall could speak to us today we think he would warn us not to be
complacent and to "do what you think is right and let the law catch up.'
' 48
Equality champions must bear his challenge. Eliminating caste is our cross
to bear.
144. Id. at 49.
145. Fiss, supra note 141, at 55.
146. Higginbotham, supra note 48, at 66.
147. Ruth Marcus, Plain-Spoken Marshall Spars With Reporters, WASH. POST, June 29, 1991, at A l;
see also Randall Kennedy, Doing What You Can With What You Have: The Greatness of Justice Mar-
shall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2081 (1992).
148. Deborah L. Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (1992).
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